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The Effects of Statutory Minimum Wages
Jaynanne Calaway
Great Britain is one of the few advanced in-
dustrialized countries without a national minimum
wage.  There is much debate regarding the effects of
statutory national minimum wages:  are they benefi-
cial, detrimental, or neither in the long-run?  More
specifically, do minimum wages increase or decrease
employment?  The traditional view based on a per-
fectly competitive labor market opposes the notion of
a national minimum wage.  Such neoclassical econo-
mists maintain that minimum wages hurt employment.
However, as more and more people come to admit
that the world is not as perfect as the classical theory
would lead us to believe, alternative models to explain
market behavior arise.  Supporters of a national mini-
mum wage suggest that it combats exploitation, helps
the poor, and can even raise the employment rate.
Finally, both sides of the theoretical debate are cogent.
Consequently, the empirical evidence is of paramount
importance.  This discussion will explore the various
theories regarding the effects of minimum wages on
employment and relative earnings for the low-paid in
an economy.  Then, we will examine the research to
consider which side the data supportsthat is, if it
does indeed conclusively decide the case one way or
the other.
First of all, who are the low-paid?  The defini-
tion of low-pay depends on the conditions specific to
a particular society and time period.  One can define
low-pay in terms of earnings or in terms of standards
of living.  In the case of the latter, though, one would
have to consider entire families and other sources of
income.  For the purpose of this discussion, we will
define low-pay in terms independent of living stan-
dards.  In terms of earnings, then, who are the low-
paid?  The lowest decile of earnings in most of Eu-
rope is made up of the young, women, part-timers,
and temporary workers.  In much of the literature, one
finds the assumption that the vast majority of the low-
paid are teenagers.  Yet, this is not true.  In Great Brit-
ain, the percentage of young workers has fallen as more
go on to higher education and also as more women
enter the workforce.  In fact, the proportion of work-
ers in the bottom decile of hourly wage distribution
who are teenagers fell from 40 percent in the mid-
1970s to 18 percent in the early 1990s (Dolado, 335).
Female part-timers now make up almost 47 percent
of those who earn less than 3 pounds an hour (Edwards,
548).
Most of us learned in Introductory Econom-
ics that any type of wage floor reduces employment.
More than 90 percent of all professional economists
agree with this conclusion, which is based on the Clas-
sical view of the world.  This model assumes that the
firm is a price-taker and that the elasticity of supply of
labor is infinite.  Both of these assumptions are im-
plausible in the real world.  Nevertheless, in a classi-
cal utopian competitive market, pay will move to
equate supply and demand.  Thus, low pay either re-
sults from low productivity during training or low la-
bor quality.  Accordingly, then, Classical economists
prescribe better training as the key to combating low
pay.
The second implication of the traditional
theory is that minimum wages lead to no improve-
ment in relative pay.  As the wages of the low-paid
rise, those workers just above them on the pay scale
will demand higher wages in order to maintain the
differentials and their relative place in society.  Every
time the minimum wage increases, not only will there
be further losses of marginal jobs, but there are also
further ripples in the entire pay structure.  If any at-
tempts are made to set the minimum wage above the
average earnings, every increase in that wage increases
the average by the same proportion.  Ultimately, the
only effect is price inflation.
As we will see, the evidence disproves this tra-
ditional view towards employment.  But, how could
this be true?  First of all, most firms are not fully price-
takers.  Secondly, the elasticity of labor supply is very
high.  As previously mentioned, women and youth
comprise the majority of the low-paid workers.  Both
groups as an aggregate have a higher elasticity of sup-
ply than most adult men.  The reason is that men are
still, in most cases, the primary wage-earners in the
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family.  Their choice to work or not to work does not
change with wage fluctuations.  Their particular oc-
cupational choice may vary, but that is not the issue.
Because women and teenagers generally provide sec-
ondary sources of income in a family, their elasticities
are much higher.  In addition, other incentives besides
wages become important, such as the cost of childcare,
tax rates, and flexible hours.  Moreover, recent stud-
ies have uncovered a real problem in Great Britain,
which affects all other areas of the economy:  a low
skill/low quality production strategy on the part of
most firms.  Low-spec production strategies only ex-
acerbate the problem of low earnings.
Let us pretend for a moment that the labor
market was perfectly competitive.  What implications
should we deduce?  Obviously, to begin with, a mini-
mum wage should not ever raise employment and it
will generally lower it.  Theoretically, the slightest
increase in the minimum wage should mean higher
unemployment for marginal workers, such as the
young, unskilled, and those approaching retirement.
Secondly, there should be no improvement in relative
pay, as those with higher pay work to maintain wage
differentials and thus their relative position in society.
Yet, especially regarding the former, there is some com-
pelling evidence to the contrarysome of which shows
a positive effect; though, most of the new evidence
shows no significant effect at all.
The most consistent alternative theory regard-
ing minimum wage effects centers around the monop-
sony model.  As the single buyer of labor, monopsonists
are conscious that any attempt on their part to buy
more labor will result in a general increase in the level
of wages in the labor market they dominate.  Hence,
monopsonists are aware that they face an upward slop-
ing marginal cost of labor curve, MC
L
, which lies to
the left of the labor supply curve for that market.  Such
a situation is depicted below.
Profit maximizing monopsonists take employ-
ment to the point at which the marginal cost of labor
equals the marginal revenue product of labor, as indi-
cated by point A, but pays a wage equal to W1/P.  Un-
der these circumstances, a skillfully set minimum wage
can increase the total earnings of labor.  The introduc-
tion of a minimum wage in excess of W1/P changes
the marginal cost of labor to the firm and therefore
effectively flattens the MC schedule.  Thus, a mini-
mum wage of W1min/P produces the marginal cost sched-
ule of DFE.  In the former case, wages are increased
by (Wmin- W1)/P without loss of employment.  In the
latter case, wages rise from W1/P to W1min/P and em-
ployment increases from L1 to L2.  In both cases, the
total earnings of labor have increased without adverse
employment consequences.  Such an outcome could
only be sustained if the firm in question were previ-
ously making supernormal profits and the rise in its
labor costs were accommodated by these.
There is one major problem with this model
thoughthe ad hoc nature of the hiring and quit-rate
functions.  Though this essay will cite evidence in the
US indicating positive effects on employment, one
should note that the theory itself does not offer a
Calaway
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straightforward explanation of the effect on unemploy-
ment.  In fact, many monopsony models reveal a shift
to the right in the entire distribution of wage offers.  A
second problem with the model is actually similar to a
problem with the traditional model in that it may still
assume labor elasticities for marginal, minimum-wage
workers to be higher than what they are.  Financial
incentives can affect the supply of labor and induce
some people to work who were not working before.
However, this may work with some groups more than
others.  Case in point, once
again, is married women.  Also
remember that, in some cases,
giving people a higher income
without making the trade-off
between work and leisure more
favorable to work will encour-
age people to actually world
fewer hoursthat is, unless
they are already working fewer
hours than they would like.
Now that we have
probed the pros and cons to
both sides of the issue, which position does the em-
pirical evidence support?  The first major splash to hit
the minimum wage debate this decade was the studies
of Card and Krueger in the United States.  Card and
Krueger researched fast food chains across America
during times of change in the minimum wage.  This
seems like a reasonable choice since fast food chains
employ a good percentage of minimum wage earners
among their workers.  Card and Krueger found some
interesting results.  When New Jersey raised its mini-
mum wage in 1992, employment did not fall in the
fast food industry.  In fact, it expanded.  They found
similar results after the 1991 increase in Texas and
the 1988 increase in California.  But, of course, these
are regional minimum wages, and we are concerned
with the effects of a national minimum wage.  Inter-
estingly, though, in their cross-state analysis, they
found that between 1990 and 1991 the federal mini-
mum wage did not adversely affect teenage unemploy-
ment.
Perhaps the most surprising finding was de-
creased wage dispersion.  Most of the other literature,
no matter what they say about effects on employment,
maintains that minimum wages do not help wage dis-
persion.  But, Card and Krueger discovered that mini-
mum wage increases accrue disproportionately to in-
dividuals in low-income families.  Moreover, they did
not seem to diminish fringe benefits.  However, they
did detect a sort of ripple effect throughout firms
workers making above minimum wage demanded
raises in order to maintain the differentials.  And, the
observed decrease in wage dispersion did not reduce
overall poverty.  The 90 cent increase in the minimum
wage between 1989 and 1991 transferred only about
$5.5 billion to low-wage workers, which is a mere .2
percent of economy-wide earn-
ings (C&K, 3).  This is quite
obviously a limited impact on
the low-paid.  Nonetheless,
there is still enough evidence in
Card and Kruegers findings to
put a severe damper on the
Classical theory.  The biggest
discrepancy is obviously the
employment effect.  Card and
Krueger found positive effects
on employment for moderate
increases in the minimum
wage, but negative effects if the floor was pushed too
high.  Thus, it appears that the evidence supports the
model of monopsony.
Thus far, we have examined data from the
United States.  However, one cannot simply transfer
conclusions from America to Europe, for the govern-
ment systems and social priorities vary greatly from
country to country.  As a result, this discussion now
turns to research in Europe in order to give a better
overall picture.  There are five distinguishable sys-
tems in Europe regarding minimum wages (Dolado,
321).  Some countries, like France, Spain, and the
Netherlands, have a statutory minimum wage set by
the government.  Other countries, such as Belgium
and Denmark, have a national minimum wage which
is set in a national collective bargaining process.  A
third type is that used by Germany, Italy, and Austria.
In this system, minimum wages are set according to
sectors, in sectoral collective agreements.  Fourthly,
Sweden, Norway, and Finland have collective agree-
ments that cover everyone; however, there are no for-
mal provisions for the extension of these agreements
to non-signatory employers.  Finally, the United King-
dom and Ireland only set minimum wages in selected
low-paying industries.  In fact, in Great Britain, the
The only sure conclu-
sion we can draw is that
the importance of mini-
mum wages appears to
be exaggerated on both
sides.
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only sector still protected by minimum wages is agri-
culture.
It is useful to distinguish these various sys-
tems in order to examine their different outcomes on
employment and relative pay.  Regarding the latter,
Dolado and his co-authors used the Kaitz index in their
study.  The Kaitz index measures the minimum wage
as a fraction of average earnings.  It is more of a gen-
eral indication than a precise measurement.  Interest-
ingly, the estimated Kaitz indices for the U.K. and the
U.S. are very similar:  in 1993, the U.K. had an esti-
mated index of .4; the U.S., of .39 (Dolado, 323).  Of
course, as with any measuring tool, there are a whole
host of concerns with using the Kaitz index (ibid, 324-
325).  Nonetheless, it is a useful indicator, especially
when looking at relative earnings.  Keeping in line
with the studies we have been discussing, Dolado and
his crew found that there have been few dramatic
changes in the Kaitz index across Europe.  When mini-
mum wages rise, average earnings rise.
To ascertain the effects on employment, it is
useful to look at a few specific countries.  In France,
the evidence suggest that the substantial rise in the
minimum wage up until the mid-1980s  had no ad-
verse effect on employment.  Some argue that at that
point, it did cause employment losses.  However, there
are other factors which must be considered.  For in-
stance, it is wholly reasonable that the economy was
simply responding to the recession which was going
on at the same time.  These are basically just summa-
ries of the observed effects in these countries, but let
us turn to the Netherlands.  In the Dutch economy as
a whole, the share of youth employment fell from 19.4
percent in 1979 to 16.4 percent in 1985 (ibid, 345).
But, once again, there were other factors similar to
those in France.  The inclusion of these examples may
seem extraneous.  However, the significance lies in
the lack of compelling evidence in either case that there
were adverse effects directly resulting from a mini-
mum wage.
Spain has a statutory minimum wage set by
the government in consultation with trade unions and
employer organizations.  The purpose is to protect
wage earners and ensure a guarantee of their pur-
chasing power and participation in the economic de-
velopment of the nation (ibid, 350).  Yet, as men-
tioned before, the Kaitz index has changed very little.
As far as the effects on employment, the evidence
shows that there was some decline in youth employ-
ment with the introduction of a national minimum
wage, but total employment rose.
Finally, we arrive at the situation in Britain.
As mentioned at the beginning, Britain has no national
minimum wage.  For that matter, it has no sectoral
minimum wages.  For while, though, it did.  In 1909,
Winston Churchill wanted to protect the pay of work-
ers in the so-called sweated trades.  His solution was
to set up the Wages Councils.  However, the number
of industries they covered dwindled over the years, so
that by 1993, the Trade Union Reform and Employ-
ment Rights Act only had 26 remaining councils to
abolish.  We can, of course, look at data during the
time period before the 1993 Act.  Measuring changes
in employment against changes in the Kaitz index for
1975 to 1992, we find a positive relationship between
the two variables.  This suggests that industries and
years in which minimum wages rose quickly in rela-
tion to average wages can be associated with faster
than average growth in employment.
Of course, the Conservative legislation in
Great Britain has considerably narrowed the scope for
any sort of wage protection mechanisms in Britain.
The pay determination system is much more frag-
mented now without the intermeshing of industry-level
minimum rates and Wages Councils setting wage
floors in the labor market.  Moreover, the move away
from manufacturing employment to more service-ori-
ented sectors has reduced the share of the workforce
covered by collective bargaining.  It is in this very
type of situation that those who advance yet another
model, based on the segmentation of the labor mar-
ket, believe that a national minimum wage is needed.
Segmentationists believe that low pay is generated
more by jobs than by workers, for workers could be
very well-trained but stuck in a bad job.  This theory
is actually very similar to the monopsony theory and
may simply highlight a different aspect of the imper-
fection of labor markets.  In a segmented labor mar-
ket, minimum wages would raise efficiency, as it would
force employers to pay workers according to their skill.
This particular approach may be most appropriate for
many unmarried females and unskilled adult males,
and the vast majority of married females.  These groups
have little choice in pay since they are typically work-
ing part-time.
In summary, the only sure conclusion we can
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draw is that the importance of minimum wages ap-
pears to be exaggerated on both sides of the debate.
The bottom line is that the theory can go either way.
The evidence does not seem to waiver much in that, in
most European countries, there has been little change
in minimum wages relative to average earnings over
the past thirty years.  Likewise, then, it is hard to ar-
gue that they have played a significant role in impact-
ing employment.  Moreover, much of the policy dis-
cussion concentrates on the effects of the young.  But,
they really make up a rather small proportion of mini-
mum wage workers.  There does seem to be some de-
cline in employment rates for the young with the insti-
tution of a minimum wage.  At the same time, though,
the evidence reveals improvements in overall employ-
ment rates, such as in France.  This might attest to the
wisdom of a lower minimum wage for the young, but
that is an issue for another paper.
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